Compulsory Self-Incrimination and Statutory Immunity by St. John\u27s Law Review
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 33 
Number 2 Volume 33, May 1959, Number 2 Article 12 
May 2013 
Compulsory Self-Incrimination and Statutory Immunity 
St. John's Law Review 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
St. John's Law Review (1959) "Compulsory Self-Incrimination and Statutory Immunity," St. John's Law 
Review: Vol. 33 : No. 2 , Article 12. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/12 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION AND STATUTORY IMMUNITY
It has been said that a peculiar excellence of our common-law
system over that which has prevailed in other civilized countries
is that an individual may never be compelled to give evidence that
would incriminate himself.' This view, expressed nearly one hundred
years ago,2 stands today in "uneasy opposition" 3 to the principle
that the state is entitled to the testimony of her citizens. 4
The development of the United States Constitution, especially
since the adoption of the Bill of Rights, has led to a marked tendency
on the part of certain observers to view the privilege against self-
incrimination as an all-embracing, singular right enjoyed by every
citizen in any and all types of situations.5 This tendency can best be
explained by the history of the privilege and its development in the
United States.
The settlement of the British colonies in the New World co-
incided with the opposition, in England, to the ex officio oath of
the ecclesiastical courts. 6 It was at this time that the privilege against
self-incrimination in the courts of common law began to have a
decided effect. 7 Since the colonies were to be governed, to a great
extent, by the common law of England,8 the privilege was introduced
into this country. While it never formed a part of English funda-
mental laws such as the Magna Carta, Petition of Right and English
Bills of Right,9 seven American colonies inserted it in their con-
stitutions or bills of rights before 1789.10 It became, therefore, a
landmark in America and assumed greater importance than it ever
had in England." It was almost inevitable that such a provision
would be enacted as a part of the federal Bill of Rights.' 2 Early
1 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMIITATIONS 647-48 n.1 (1927 ed.).
2 Grant, Immunity From Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal
System of Government, 9 TEmP. L.Q. 57 n.4 (1934).
3 Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 447, 448 (1954).
4 Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1454 (1957). See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25
Fed. Cas. 38 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
5 See, e.g., GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMEND-MENT TODAY 1-30 (1955);
Straight, Congressional Encroachment, 5 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA ComIP. 37(1954) ; Redlich, Reasons For Invoking, 5 id. at 42; Sheppard, Texas Attorney
General, 5 id. at 76.
6 Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination in Anerica, 21 VA. L. Rmv. 763, 769 (1935).
7 Ibid.
8 Id. at 766.
9 Id. at 764.
10 Id. at 764-65. The states which so adopted it were Virginia (June
1776), Pennsylvania (September 1776), Maryland (November 1776), North
Carolina (December 1776), Vermont (July 1777), Massachusetts (March
1780), and New Hampshire (1784).
118 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 301 (3d ed. 1940).
12 U. S. CONST. amend. V.
[ VOL. 33
NOTES
lawmakers did not define the scope of the privilege against self-
incrimination.13 In this absence of definition the courts have extended
the privilege not only to an accused but also to a witness,1 4 in
almost every type of legal proceeding where a criminal prosecution
may result.1 A close analysis of the origin and development of the
privilege reveals that its meaning and utilization is twofold.16 There
is the privilege of an accused not to take the witness stand at all.'1
Because of our accusatorial method wherein the prosecution sustains
the burden of proof, this protection is designed for those who must
be assumed innocent.' s This is the fundamental bulwark of the entire
area of freedom from self-incrimination.'"
The second aspect of the privilege is the choice which a witness
has in a proceeding in which he is not the accused, to either answer
or refuse to answer a question or line of questioning that might
incriminate him.20 This privilege is only available for those witnesses
who may very well be guilty,2' for a man only has the right to
invoke it when his truthful answer to the question might tend to
incriminate him.22 While it is for the court to pass upon the question
whether a truthful answer might reasonably be incriminating,23 its
13 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (3d. ed. 1940). See, e.g., Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). This case intertwines the fourth and fifth amend-
ments by slating that compulsory self-incrimination is contrary to the principles
of a free government and is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. Id. at
631-32; United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 39 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va.
1807). This case laid down the rule that the judge decides whether a correct
answer would incriminate, yet it allows the privilege to extend to a witness.
14 United States v. Burr, supra note 13, at 39.
15 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) ; People ex rel. Lewisohn
v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 261, 68 N.E. 353, 355 (1903). See Dixon, The Fifth
Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Gzo. WA sr. L. REv. 447, 449
(1954).
16 See 8 WIGUORE, EVIDEXCE § 2276, at 438-41 (3d ed. 1940). But cf.
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); Connors v. People, 50 N.Y.
240 (1872).
2 8 WIGmaORE, op. cit. supra note 16, § 2276, at 441; Corwin, The Supremze
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 27 MICH. L. REv. 1, 9
(1930)..
1 Bartlett v. Lewis, 12 C.B. (n.s.) 249, 265, 142 Eng. Rep. 1139, 1145
(C.P. 1862) (concurring opinion). 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 16, §2251,
at 308. See Moreland, Historical Background and Implications of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrhnmination, 44 Ky. L.J' 267 (1956).
19 See generally, Corwin, Legal Status, 5 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Comp.
19 (1954); INBATJ, SE F-INcRIMINATION 5 (1950).
20 Counselman v. Hitchcock, supra note 16, at 562; 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2266, at 388 (3d ed. 1940).
21 8 WIGM PE, EvIDENCE § 2251, at 307-08 (3d ed. 1940). Contra, GRISWOLD,
THE FIFr AMEND.MET TODAY 56-57 (1955).
22 Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1454, 1455 (1957).
23 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); United States v.
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38, 40 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807); 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2271, at 403-09 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1455(1957).
1959 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
tendency to be so is ultimately determined by the witness himself 24
If he chooses not to answer, it is perhaps logical that the inference
drawn from this refusal is that he is confessing the fact.
23
This should not be taken as an indictment of all the witnesses
in trials, grand jury proceedings and congressional investigations
who have ever pleaded the privilege. At times, an over-zealous
prosecutor or a committee chairman more interested in publicity than
in information may transform the proceeding into one which, in effect,
treats the witness as if he were an accused. 20  In such a case the
"witness" should be allowed all the privileges attending an accused.27
Nevertheless, this basic confusion and intermingling of the priv-
ilege of an accused and that of a witness has presented a dilemma for
federal and state law enforcement agencies. For while we might
agree that it be vital that a man have such a privilege we must
also agree that the government is entitled to the testimony of her
citizens.28 With the privilege now extended to almost every type of
legal proceeding, 29 the administration of justice has been "ham-
pered." 30 This problem, recognized by both federal and state legis-
latures, has led to the enactment of devices to curtail the privilege
while still effectuating its purpose.31
The Immunity Statutes
Perhaps the most extensively used method of circumventing the
privilege afforded witnesses has been the use of "immunity" statutes.32
Such a statute, when invoked, removes the witness' privilege against
self-incrimination, thereby compelling him to testify, in exchange for
an immunity from prosecution by the particular jurisdiction so com-
pelling.33 The theory of the law is that if the threat of prosecution is
24 Mason. v. United States, 244 U.S. 362, 363-364 (1917); United States v.
Burr, supra note 23, at 39-40.
25 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 21, § 2272, at 409-10. For a contrary
approach, see GRiswoLD, THE FIrH AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).
26 See Stokes, An Expanding Issue, 5 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA Comp. 27, 30
(1954); Note, 70 HARv. L. Rzv. 1454, 1456-57 (1957).
27 See Straight, Congressional Encroachment, 5 VA. L. WEEKLY DICTA
Comp. 37 (1954).
28 Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1454 (1957).
29 See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892); People v.
O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 261 (1903).30 Note, 10 OKLA. L. Rr-v. 334, 335 (.1957).
31 See Ullmann v. United States. 350 U.S. 422' (1956) ; Scribner v. State,
9 Okla. Cr. 465, 132 Pac. 933 (1913); Note, 31 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 78, 79-80
(1956).
32 Note, 31 ST. JoHN's L. Rtv. s,-pra note 31. Another device employed
is the requiring of a waiver of immunity as a condition to continuing em-
ployment. Ibid.
33 See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 379 (1958) ; Note, 31 ST. JoHN's
L. REv. 66, 67 (1956).
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removed the justification for the exercise of the privilege ceases, and
thus the witness must answer.3 4 It is, in effect, an anticipatory exer-
cise of the pardoning power.35 The first such act, enacted in 1857,36
was passed as an emergency measure to aid a House committee in-
vestigating charges of parliamentary corruption, and received little
discussion on the floor of either house.3 7 A decade later the first
national immunity act of general application was passed.38 It provided
that no answer or other pleading of any party, and no discovery, or evidence
obtained by means of any judicial proceeding from any party or witness in
this or any foreign country, shall be given in evidence, or in any manner
used against such party or witness, or his property or estate, in any court
of the United States, or in any proceeding by or before any officer of the
United States, in respect to any crime, or for the enforcement of any penalty
or forfeiture by reason of any act or omission of such party or witness .... 39
During five years of experience with the 1857 law, there was criticism
of the breadth of the act in disallowing "any fact or act touching
which he shall be required to testify" from being used in subsequent
proceedings.40  It was therefore amended to read simply, "the testi-
mony of a witness . . . shall not be used as evidence in any criminal
proceeding against such witness in any court of justice .... ,, 41 Con-
gress was now of the opinion that this was all that the Constitution re-
quired, a view which was not entirely unjustified, having the support
of various state court decisions construing similar guaranties in state
enactments.42 Possibly as a result, succeeding immunity statutes were
similarly rstricted in scope.43 It was not until the Supreme Court
held, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,44 that "a statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for
the offense to which the question relates," 45 that Congress returned to
34 8 WIGmoRE, EvlDEmcE § 2281, at 467 (3d ed. 1940) ; Note, 31 ST. JOHN'S
L. Rrv. 78, 79-80 (1956).
35 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, THIRD REPORT, N.Y. STATE CRIME COMMISSION
14, 15 (1953).
36 Act of Jan. 26, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156. See Grant, Immutity From
Compulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government, 9 TEMP.
L.Q. 57, 62 (1935).
37 Grant, supra note 36, at 62.
38 Id. at 63.
39 Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
40 Act of Jan. 26, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 156. See Grant, supra note
36, at 64.
4' Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, 12 Stat. 333; Grant, Immunity From Self-
Incrimination in a Federal System of Government, 9 TEMP. L.Q. 57, 64
(1935).
42 Grant, supra note 41. See State v. Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853) ; Higdon
v. Heard, 14 Ga. 255 (1853) ; Wilkins v. Malone, 14 Ind. 153 (1860).
43 Act of far. 2, 1889, ch. 382, § 3, 25 Stat. 858; Act of Mar. 3, 1887,
ch. 345, § 2, 24 Stat. 491 ; Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
44 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
45 Id. at 586.
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its original plan of granting immunity for "any transaction, matter or
thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence .. . . 46
New York State, having a constitutional provision of its own
against self-incrimination, 47 enacted various immunity statutes in
order to obtain needed testimony. 48 In 1903, in the case of People
ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien,49 the Court of Appeals held that the
immunity conferred under section 342 of the Penal Code was not
co-extensive with the constitutional guarantee of freedom from self-
incrimination.5" The court insisted that for a witness to be compelled
to testify, his immunity must protect him from prosecution for any
crime that he may allude to in the course of his testimony.51 How-
ever, it was not until 1953 that a single, all-embracing immunity
statute was enacted 52 granting immunity from prosecution or sub-
jection to any penalty or forfeiture (except perjury) to any witness
who was instructed to answer after claiming the privilege.53 Thus,
New York adopted in toto the federal position.
54
The law, section 2447 of the Penal Code, attempts to solve some
of the problems and shortcomings of immunity statutes in general. 55
However in so doing it creates problems of its own.
The statute provides that
in any investigation or proceeding where, by express provision of statute,
a competent authority is authorized to confer immunity, if a person refuses
to answer a question . . .on the ground that he may be incriminated thereby,
and, notwithstanding such refusal, an order is made by such competent authority
that such person answer the question ...such person shall.comply with the
order. If such person complies with the order, and if, but for this section,
he would have been privileged to withhold the answer . . .then immunity shall
be conferred upon him .... 56
The statute defines "immunity" to mean
that such person shall not be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or for-
feiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which,
46 Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 444.
47 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, § 6 (1894).
48 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 789; N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 16
(Supp. 1958); N.Y GEN. Bus. LAW § 345.
49 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903).
59 Following the reasoning in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892). Section 342 merely excluded the use of testimony given while com-
pelling the witness to answer.51 176 N.Y. 253, 259, 68 N.E. 353, 355 (1903).
52 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447. Up to this time there were forty-six separate
immunity statutes. 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, THm REPORT, N.Y. STATE CRIME
Comi IssioN 14, 15 (1953).
53 Ibid.
54 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
55 See 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, supra note 52, at 14.
56 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447(1).
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in accordance with the order by competent authority, he gave answer ...and
that no such answer . .. shall be received against him upon any criminal
proceeding.57
It states that such person may, however, be prosecuted for any
act of perjury or contempt in answering or failing to answer in
accordance with this order, and that the answer given shall be
admissible against him upon any criminal proceeding concerning such
perjury or contempt.58
This complete immunity, not a revolutionary concept,59 was the
cause of much concern as to the possibility of "immunity baths" 60
being given inadvertently- to "eager witnesses," 61 who might thereby
"tell all" and emerge absolved from punishment. As a safeguard
against this unhappy event a provision that the immunity can only
be granted by "order of a competent authority" was adopted.6 2 A
"competent authority" is defined as either a court or magistrate before
whom a person is called upon to answer questions in a criminal
proceeding when such court or magistrate is expressly requested
by the prosecuting attorney to order such person to answer; a civil
court to which the state or subdivision thereof (including agencies
and departments) or any officer in official capacity, is a party and
is requested by the attorney general to answer; a majority of a
grand jury when requested by the prosecuting attorney; and a leg-
islative committee, state commission, head of a state department or
agency before whom a witness is appearing, upon twenty-four hours
prior written notice to the attorney general and the appropriate
district attorney.0 3 While certainly this provision lessens the danger
of an immunity bath there is still the possibility of an improvident
grant of immunity. At best all this provision does is make reasonably
certain that the decision to grant immunity will be made at a "high
level." 64 The Crime Commission which suggested this law stated
that the immunity should only be given where there is an "over-
riding public interest" 65 for the compulsion of testimony. Yet, the
law itself has no such limitation. Any competent authority can give
this immunity. Other recommendations of the committee were
57 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447 (2).
58 Ibid.
59 See, e.g., N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAW § 16 (Supp. 1958).
60 Note, 70 HARv. L. Rav. 1454, 1462 (1957). An immunity bath is ex-
plained as a witness volunteering answers, disclosing personal malefaction
and thereby obtaining freedom from prosecution. Note, 31 ST. JOHN's L. 1Ev.
66, 67-68 (1956).
61 See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv., supra note 60. It is assumed that the
witness' answer is in some way responsive to the question asked.
62 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, THIRD REPORT, N.Y. STATE CRIME COMMISSION
14-15 (1953).
63 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2447(3).
64 Note, 70 HARv. L. REV., supra note 60.
65 1953 LEG. Doc. No. 68, supra note 62, at 15.
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adopted, and are certainly assets: the immunity is not to be used
in a civil action in which only private litigants are parties; the wit-
ness must first, in good faith, claim his privilege; and the witness
must testify pursuant to such direction of the competent authority. 66
The commission did not recommend, nor does the law include,
other provisions to safeguard the public while protecting the witness.
It would seem reasonable to limit the application of the statute to
witnesses called by the government, thus insuring an authoritative
determination whether the anticipated testimony is a worthy trade
for the ensuing immunity.67 Such a provision is not included. Ques-
tioned also is the need for the immunity in any type of civil pro-
ceeding. Since the purpose of the law is to get valuable information
to convict others, should the immunity be "traded" for a civil victory?
Effects of Immunity Statutes on Witnesses
The above problems might detract from successful governmental
operation under the statute. Most criticism of the statute, however,
is directed toward its effects on the individual witness. For the
immunity to be constitutional, as one jurist has put it, it must be as
broad as the privilege it replaces. 68 The privilege extends to evi-
dence tending to incriminate the witness in the particular jurisdiction
in which the proceeding is being conducted. 69 There is no right to
the privilege if the information disclosed will incriminate the witness
only in another jurisdiction." Therefore the immunity granted only
extends to prosecutions in that jurisdiction. 71 Though on the surface
of the explanation there seems to be present no problem, there have
been doubts raised as to the adequacy 72 and constitutionality73 of these
statutes. Perhaps where the evidence disclosed would incriminate
the witness in a sister-state or in a foreign country there is not too
much danger of the witness' privilege being violated. 74  But where
the proceeding is by a state, and the witness would tend to incrim-
inate himself under a federal statute, the immunity no longer seems
"co-extensive" with the privilege. 75 In such a case the federal govern-
ment could literally wait outside the door of the courtroom and
66 Id. at 15-16.
67 Note, 70 HARV. L. REV, 1454, 1462 (1957).
68 See Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 141 (1911).
69 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 2258, at 337 (3d ed. 1940).
79 Ibid.
71 See Note, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1454, 1463 (1957).
72 See GRIswOLD, THE FiFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 80-81 (1955).
73 See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 382 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
74 Cf. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896) ; Note, 70 HARV. L. REV.
1454, 1463-64 (1957).
75 See Knapp v. Schweitzer, supra note 73.
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arrest the witness when he emerged, using his own testimony against
* him.76
Sinqe the purpose of the immunity is to obtain needed informa-
tion,77 much of its value is lost if the witness, realizing that he will
be susceptible to federal prosecution, would rather be held in con-
tempt of court than accept his illusory immunity.78
The states, though perhaps realizing this dilemma, are powerless
to broaden their immunity statutes even should they wish to do so.
It would certainly be unconstitutional for a state to attempt to grant
immunity from prosecution in federal courts. 70 Although, conversely,
an immunity given in a federal proceeding need not shield the witness
from state prosecution to be constitutional, 0 in at least one instance
Congress deemed the information desired so important that it did
authorize the granting of immunity from both federal and state
prosecution.81
a In assessing whether the state immunity statutes which protect
a witness only within the granting jurisdiction are unconstitutional
and unfair or constitutional and equitable, one must first decide
whether the privilege itself is a "landmark" to our way of life, as
some spokesmen insist,8 2 or is no more inviolate than any other
provision in a state constitution.8 3  The Supreme Court has said
that the privilege in the fifth amendment applies only to the federal
government, and that the "privileges" referred to in the fourteenth
amendment do not include this one.8s  This, however, does not
obviate the question whether a faulty immunity statute would violate
state constitutional enactments.
In Michigan, the state constitution has been interpreted as pre-
venting compulsion of testimony which might tend to incriminate
76 However, if there is collusion between state and federal authorities, it
appears the courts will consider it a waiver of federal prosecution. Cf.,
Jarosuk v. United States, 201 F.2d 52 (9th Cir. 1953) (per curiam); Byars v.
United States, 273 U.S. 28, 33 (1927) (dictum); Note, 70 HARV. L. REv.
1454, 1462 (1957). See also Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586(1892).
77 Grant, Self-Incrimnbtation In The Modern Amcrican Law, 5 TEP. L.Q.
368, 393 (1931).
78 See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Commissioner of
Investigation v. Lombardozzi, 7 App. Div. 2d 48, 180 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1st Dep't
1958).
79 Jack v. Kansas, 199 U.S. 372, 380 (1905).
80 See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1454, 1463 (1957). This doctrine, under
which courts refuse to consider the consequences which may ensue in otherjurisdictions, has been called the "dual sovereignty" doctrine. Ibid.
81 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (1954) ; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434-36(1956).
82 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631-32 (1886) (Bradley, J.);
GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 7 (1955).
83 See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). Cf. Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-102 (1908).
84 Knapp v. Schweitzer, sufrt note 83; Twining v. New Jersey, supra
note 83.
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the witness under federal law, even though he has been granted full
immunity from state prosecution.85 The same sentiment appears to
prevail in Louisiana.86 Conversely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in
Knapp v. Schweitzer,87 stresses the division of political and legal
powers between two systems of government constituting a single
nation.8 8 He points out the necessity of immunity statutes by stating
that
the States may find it necessary, as did New York, to require full disclosure
in exchange for immunity from prosecution. This cannot be denied on the
claim that such state law of immunity may expose the potential witness to
prosecution under federal law.89
Mr. Justice Black claimed that such a result would be a violation
of the fifth amendment. He states that
a person can be whipsawed into incriminating himself under both state and
federal law even though there is a privilege against self-incrimination in
the Constitution of both.90
Conclusion
The immunity statutes, in negating the privilege, must be so
worded that their effect is not to penalize the witness while attaining
their necessary result. On the other hand, they should not be so
loosely phrased that undeserving witnesses receive their benefit.
It is suggested that the courts should be wary of possible col-
lusion between state and federal authorities in the granting of state
immunity for the purpose of opening the door to federal prosecution.
Questioned also is the usefulness of the statute where the witness
obviously will not comply for fear of federal intervention. Although
the'purpose of the statute is disclosure, its only effect in these cir-
cumstances is to punish an uncooperative witness.
Although the view adopted by the Supreme Court does not
extend the federal privilege to the states, it is believed that it has
become such an important part of our accusatorial system that the
states must give it full effect.
The Michigan view is felt to be more consonant with the spirit
of the federal and state -constitutions. If the privilege and its at-
tendant immunity statute only become weapons to "get" witnesses,
be they guilty or innocent, then our system of jurisprudence is ap-
proaching the totalitarian form of government which we so rightly
and vigorously condemn.
85 Knapp v. Schweitzer, su~pra note 83, at 384 n.1; People v. Den Uyl, 318
Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
86 State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 So. 2d 12 (1955). See 42 VA. L. REv.
84 (1956).
8 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
88 Id. at 375.
89 Id. at 379.
90 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 385 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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